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Abstract. The personality of a negotiator shall affect his choice of tactics. Moreover, 
mixed predictions of the personality-tactic relationship have been derived from prior stud-
ies. One possible explanation is the influence of other intervening factors. In this regard, 
this study examines the role of withdrawal, as an intervening variable, in the negotia-
tor personality-tactic relationship. State of withdrawal refers to the level of interest to 
continue with a negotiation. In a state of complete withdrawal, the interest to continue 
no longer exists and breakdown of the negotiation is inevitable. With the participation 
of practicing professionals, an experiment was used to collect data for the study. It was 
found that competitors are prone to withdraw and use more distributive tactics. However, 
this pattern changes with the composition of the dyad. If the negotiating counterpart is a 
cooperator, a competitor will adopt a more integrative approach. This finding reminds the 
importance of the personality factor in selecting members of a negotiating team.
Keywords: personality, organization, strategy, strategic management, tactic, withdrawal, 
negotiator behavior, negotiation outcome.
JEL Classification: L20.
Introduction 
Construction contracting environment is inherently dispute-laden and most of the con-
struction disputes are settled through negotiation (Cheung, Yiu 2006). However, it is 
thought provoking that some negotiations fail even when mutually acceptable settlement 
options are notable (O’Connor, Gladstone 2015; Olekalns, Smith 2013). This phenom-
enon does not fit well with the rational school that assumes negotiators are maximisers. 
Behaviorists have attributed this happening to the influence of negotiators’ personal 
qualities – personality (O’Connor, Gladstone 2015). Cheung et al. (2009) further found 
that a negotiator’s personality is intrinsically linked to his choice of tactic because per-
sonality influences the way a negotiator interprets a dispute. For example, a cooperative 
negotiator may view a challenge by his counterpart as an attempt to explore better op-
tions, but a competitive negotiator may view the same challenge as a threat. This type 
of attitudinal responses would influence a negotiator’s interest to continue with the 
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negotiation and thereby the tactics that he will use. Apart from personality, negotiators 
also employ tactics responsive to the contextual constraints. Mixed predictions on the 
causal relationship between personality and tactic have been reported (Yiu et al. 2008). 
For example, Toma et al. (2012) suggested that cooperators tend to employ integra-
tive tactics and competitors use distributive tactics more readily. However, O’Connor, 
Gladstone (2015) proposed that competitors use more integrative tactics to achieve their 
self-interest goal and cooperators use more distributive tactics to protect themselves 
from being exploited. It is, therefore, plausible that there may be some intervening vari-
ables between personality and tactic. Volkema et al. (2010) suggested that negotiators 
who have low level of interest to negotiate would reject mutually beneficial offers when 
his counterpart is using distributive tactics. Withdrawal, defined as the loss of interest 
to continue with a negotiation, is suggested to be an intervening variable. Withdrawal 
is also disruptive for its detrimental effect on prospective negotiated settlement (Pruitt, 
Kim 2004; Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2008). The study aims to offer an explanation 
to the intriguing observation that some negotiations fails to capitalize on the available 
mutually beneficial settlement options by examining the relationship among personality, 
tactic and withdrawal. In particular, the influence of withdrawal on the choice of tactics 
with respect to the personality of the negotiator is examined. The findings and discus-
sions of withdrawal would help to explain the mixed predictions on the personality-
tactic relationship. This paper begins with a review of the literature on personality, tactic 
and withdrawal. Hypotheses are then developed and followed by discussion on research 
methodology. Data analysis and findings are then presented. The paper ends with the 
discussion on theoretical contributions, managerial implications, and limitations. 
1. Literature review
1.1. Personality
Negotiation studies identify negotiators who consider only own concern as competitors, 
whereas ones who consider both own and the counterparts’ concern as cooperators 
(Prietula, Weingart 2011). Competitors and cooperators use tactics that reflect their pref-
erence in the types of gains and outcomes. In term of tactics, competitors would adopt 
high-handed approaches and treat negotiation as distributive (Volkema et al. 2010), 
while cooperators would more readily employ integrative strategies that explore joint 
gain potential and expand common interests (Lewicki et al. 2010; Pruitt, Kim 2004). 
In term of outcomes, competitors focus mainly on maximizing own outcomes, while 
cooperators expect compliment. 
1.2. Negotiator tactics
Negotiation research identifies two principle types of tactic: distributive and integrative 
(Olekalns, Smith 2013; Prietula, Weingart 2011). Distributive tactics aim to divide re-
sources among negotiating parties and integrative tactics seek to maximize the overall 
outcome (Pruitt, Kim 2004). The former prompts positional bargaining and bluffing, 
while the latter encourages information exchanges and facilitates mutually beneficial 
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trade-offs (Olekalns, Smith 2003; Thompson 2012). Using appropriate tactics is part 
of the game plan of any negotiation. In general, distributive tactics are used to assert 
positions and press for concessions through forceful argument and sometimes threats 
(Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2008). On the other hand, integrative tactics are used to 
strive for creation of joint values and direct at improving the understanding of the needs 
and wishes of the negotiating parties. Enhancing information exchange to derive mutu-
ally beneficial agreement is commonly observed in integrative negotiations (Prietula, 
Weingart 2011). 
1.3. Withdrawal
A negotiator who has a strong desire to settle will take a positive approach in a ne-
gotiation and enthusiastically consider every proposal on the table. Pragmatically, a 
negotiation with a withdrawing party is doomed. Withdrawal happens when a nego-
tiator loses interest to continue with the negotiation (Cheung, Chow 2011; Olekalns, 
Smith 2003). The states of withdrawal range from “continuation” to “breakdown”. The 
lower the interest to continue, the higher the state of withdrawal and the more likely 
the negotiation will breakdown (O’Connor, Gladstone 2015). Furthermore, it is ex-
tremely resource-laden to resume a withdrawn negotiation as noted in the deadlock 
of many international disputes (Cheung, Chow 2011). In these cases, withdrawal had 
led negotiations to stalemates or impasses even though prospective settlement options 
were notably present (Kesting, Smolinski 2007; O’Connor, Gladstone 2015; Prietula, 
Weingart 2011). If withdrawing behaviors occur at the early stage of a negotiation and 
are not unrestrained, the chance of a negotiation breakdown intensifies (Cheung, Chow 
2011). In other words, high withdrawal is accompanied by the use of distributive tactics 
and low withdrawal leads to more use of integrative tactics (O’Connor, Gladstone 2015; 
Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2008; Sinaceur, Tiedens 2006; Thompson 2012). 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
This study posits that choice of tactic is contingent to the contexts of a negotiation. It 
is hypothesized that personality and withdrawal influence the choice of tactic and thus 
ultimately affect the negotiation outcome (Cheung, Chow 2011; Yiu et al. 2008). In a 
negotiation, the parties engage in a joint decision process of getting a mutually accept-
able settlement. Consensual agreement is a must as none of the parties has any authority 
to adjudicate. A negotiation begins with either distributive or integrative responses and 
largely depends on the negotiators’ personality and his desire to negotiate – state of 
withdrawal (Bhanugopan, Fish 2006). In addition, research on personality and tactic in 
experimental gaming indicates that cooperators would become less cooperative if their 
counterparts consistently employ distributive tactics (Olekalns, Smith 2003; Prietula, 
Weingart 2011). Negotiators may also withdraw in response to the distributive behavior 
used by individualistic opponents (Rhoades et al. 2001). The tendency to withdraw, at 
the same time, negatively influences the way negotiators interpret their counterparts’ 
tactics, especially in face-to-face negotiations (O’Connor, Gladstone 2015; Olekalns, 
Smith 2003). It is proposed that competitive mindset; high withdrawal and distributive 
acts have negative influence on a negotiation. Five hypotheses have been developed:
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H1: Competitors have higher state of withdrawal than cooperators.
H2: The higher the state of withdrawal of a negotiator is, the more likely the negotiation 
is to be conducted in a distributive fashion. 
H3: The higher the state of withdrawal of a negotiator is, the lower is the utility of the 
achieved outcome. 
H4: Competitors use more distributive tactics than cooperators.
H5: Distributive negotiations result in lower joint gain than integrative negotiations.
3. Methodology
3.1. Experiment design
An experiment was used to collect data to test the hypotheses (Olekalns, Smith 2013; 
Pruitt, Kim 2004; Thompson 2012). The tasks to be negotiated were developed based 
on real-life disputes between main contractors and developers. The participants in each 
round of the bilateral negotiation were the sole representatives of the two organiza-
tions (the “Contractor” and the “Developer”). A pilot run with experienced construction 
professionals confirmed the relevance and appropriateness of the tasks. The pilot also 
indicates that the negotiation tasks could be completed from 30 minutes to an hour 
(Cheung, Chow 2011). The data collected from the subjects allow the researchers to 
make dyads comparisons (Olekalns, Smith 2013).
3.2. Measurement scale
3.2.1. Personality
A simplified decomposed-game was used to develop a dichotomy between competitors 
and cooperators (Olekalns, Smith 2013). The subjects had to choose between two op-
tions allocating the percentage of money to themselves and their counterparts; option 1 
is 40% to themselves and 10% to their counterparts and option 2 is 30% to themselves 
and 30% to their counterparts (Prietula, Weingart 2011). The total of the outcome is not 
100% to take account of the inherent transaction cost. The measurement of personal-
ity was taken at the registration of the experiment. An instruction from the company’s 
senior management was used to induce external influence before the negotiation. The 
instruction of either “maximize own outcome” or “maximize joint outcome” was as-
signed to the subjects. 
3.2.2. Tactics
A tactic may fall within a continuum between purely distributive and purely integra-
tive. Distributive tactics focus on collecting more and giving less information; and 
pressing for concession, while integrative tactics stress the importance of exchanging 
priorities; showing insight into others’ perspective; and developing trust, confidence 
and sympathy toward the other parties (Brett et al. 2007; Lewicki et al. 2010). A cod-
ing scheme developed from those used by Pruitt and Kim (2004) was employed in this 
study (Table 1). The negotiations were recorded then transcribed, translated and coded 
for analysis. The transcripts were coded by two raters. Any discrepancies between the 
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raters were resolved through discussion. The level of argument of the coded transcripts 
was checked by Kappa. Kappa, an inter-rater reliability test, is calculated by Eq. (1). 
Kappa of value from 0.70 to 0.74 are classified as very good, and those at or above 0.75 
are classified as excellent (Bakeman, Robinson 2005). It is assumed that each unit to 
be coded has the same probability of accurate classification, and then the probability of 
Table 1. The coding of distributive and integrative tactics
Coding Tactic Example
DT_1 Attacking the counterpart’s position Why you choose to … in this issue?
DT_2 Requesting bottom line of the 
counterpart
What’s your lowest possible price?
DT_3 Rejecting the counterpart’s offer I can’t accept this.
DT_4 Referring to bottom line I won’t have other choices.
DT_5 Notifying serious differences between 
parties
I can’t see that we have the same target.
DT_6 Expressing negative emotion word It is ridiculous!
DT_7 Using threat If you don’t accept it, I will take legal 
action.
DT_8 Abusing power I am the one to determine the claim.
DT_9 Insisting in own position As mentioned before, I want to …
DT_10 Making offer which needs the concession 
of other parties
I suggest you giving up…. this issue.
IN_1 Providing own priorities ... is the most important for me.
IN_2 Making provision for preferences and/or 
priorities
I would prefer … when talking about…
IN_3 Giving insight about other parties’ 
concern and/or situation
I know that your uncertainty is….
IN_4 Notifying similarities between parties I can see that we have the same target.
IN_5 Notifying general differences between 
parties
I can see that we have the differences in 
….
IN_6 Giving positive emotion word That’s great.
IN_7 Suggesting compromise I think we need to make concession on 
this issue.
IN_8 Guaranteeing the validation of previous 
statement
I must pay you the amount that we have 
agreed.
IN_9 Exerting time pressure I don’t think we have much time.
IN_10 Making explicit multi-issue trade-off 
offer for resolution
What about if we choose A in … and B 
in…?
MI Other Maybe we should go on to other issues.
Notes: DT: Distributive Tactic; IN: Integrative Tactic; MI: Miscellaneous.
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chance agreement (Pc) is 1/k, where k is the number of categories in the coding scheme 












where Po is the observed percentage agreement among coders and Pc is the proportion 
of chance agreement. 
3.2.3. Withdrawal
Manifestations of withdrawal include plans to search for alternative and general thoughts 
or considerations of quitting (Bhanugopan, Fish 2006). Increase in level of withdrawal 
weakens the ties of social relations between negotiators. Withdrawal has been linked 
with exhaustion, wearing out, failing, and ultimately burnout. Burnout takes the form 
of physical, emotional, and psychological response to stress (Bhanugopan, Fish 2006). 
Thus, burnout underpins decisions to withdraw which can be detected in negotiation 
by three measureable components (Cropanzano et al. 2003). The first component is a 
chronic state of exhaustion – emotional exhaustion. The second component is a type 
of interpersonal distancing and a lack of connectedness with the counterparts – deper-
sonalization. The last component is a negative evaluation of the self – reduced personal 
accomplishment (Cheung, Chow 2011). Six indicators are used to measure the state of 
withdrawal in this study (Cheung, Chow 2011). In the experiment, two measurements 
of the state of withdrawal were made, one each at pre and post negotiation.
4. Subjects and procedure
In many negotiation studies, the subjects were university students (Rodriguez Mosquera 
et al. 2008; Prietula, Weingart 2011). In this study, practicing construction professionals 
participated as subjects to augment the authenticity of the findings. Prospective subjects 
were those who have experience in dispute negotiation and are currently practicing 
in the construction industry. Around 1000 construction practitioners were invited to 
participate in the study with their contacts obtained from company directories and the 
member lists of professional institutes such as the Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors 
(HKIS) and the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers (HKIE). Subjects were contacted 
either by phone or email. Participants were given confidential information on roles of 
and a 20-minute PowerPoint presentation of (1) the Project situation, (2) the four dispute 
issues to be negotiated, (3) the options available for each issue, and (4) instructions from 
the company’s senior management before negotiation. The susceptibility of the subjects 
to their organization’s instructions was checked by asking participant to identify their 
primary objective from three options, i.e. (1) maximize own gain, (2) maximize joint 
gain, or (3) none of these two. 
5. Tasks to be negotiated
The scenario was about the construction of a commercial building with the use of 
Standard Form of Building Contract (the “Contract”). There are four issues in dispute: 
(1) rapid inflation of steel price, (2) additional sky garden, (3) prolonged inclement 
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weather, and (4) change of supplier. Negotiators were allowed to continue the negotia-
tion until they considered that no further progress could be made. Table 2 shows the 
payoff schedules for the Contractor and the Developer. The payoffs of Issues 1 and 3 
are integrative in which better joint gain can be achieved if negotiators could make 
all concession trade-off. The payoffs of Issues 2 and 4 are distributive as the negotia-
Table 2. Payoff matrices of the negotiation




A 0 0% 0 600,000 600,000
B 1,250,000 25% 344,415 554,328 898,743
C 2,500,000 50% 636,396 424,264 1,060,660
D 3,750,000 75% 831,492 229,610 1,061,102
E 5,000,000 100% 900,000 0 900,000
Fii –831,492 229,610 –601,882
2
A 0 0% 0 400,000 400,000
B 1,000,000 25% 75,000 300,000 375,000
C 2,000,000 50% 150,000 200,000 350,000
D 3,000,000 75% 225,000 100,000 325,000
E 4,000,000 100% 300,000 0 300,000
F 75,000 0 75,000
3
A 0 0% 0 900,000 900,000
B 500,000 25% 229,610 831,492 1,061,102
C 1,000,000 50% 424,264 636,396 1,060,660
D 1,500,000 75% 554,328 344,415 898,743
E 2,000,000 100% 600,000 0 600,000
F 229,610 –831,492 –601,882
4
A 0 0% 0 300,000 300,000
B 750,000 25% 100,000 225,000 325,000
C 1,500,000 50% 200,000 150,000 350,000
D 2,250,000 75% 300,000 75,000 375,000
E 3,000,000 100% 400,000 0 400,000
F 0 75,000 75,000
Grand 
Total
Maximum 2,200,000 2,200,000 2,963,330
Minimum 0 0 1,800,000
Negotiation Breakdown –526,882 –526,882 –1,053,763
Notes: Issue 1: rapid inflation of steel, Issue 2: additional sky garden, Issue 3: prolonged inclement 
weather, and Issue 4: change of supplier; amounti: Figure is a collective representation of the time, 
cost quality implied in each option which is not necessarily proportion among disputes; Fii: negotiation 
breakdown and its consequence is that (a) the dispute issue is left unresolved; (b) the dispute issue 
is referred to mediation, arbitration or litigation; or (c) the contract is determined; Negotiators are al-
lowed beholding their own payoff and are not allowed to exchange preference charts.
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tors’ interests were opposite. Upon completion of the experiment, a shopping coupon 
of HK$100 (about US$12) was presented as a token of thanks. There was no other 
incentive in relation to the outcome of the negotiation (Patton, Balakrishnan 2010). For 
analysis purposes, negotiation outcomes are classified according to the monetary returns 
as represented by the negotiated settlement options (Olekalns, Smith 2003). To achieve 
high individual and joint gains, negotiators have to make trade-offs among the four is-
sues (Prietula, Weingart 2011). If negotiators can materialize all the valuable trade-offs, 
the joint monetary payoffs are HK$2,963,330. Lowest joint gain occurs when negotia-
tors jointly reach HK$1,800,000. Individual maximum and minimum monetary payoffs 
are HK$2,200,000 and HK$0 respectively for both the Contractor and the Developer. 
If complete breakdown occurs, a debt of HK$526,882 shall be incurred by both com-
panies. As an example, if the negotiation ends with the decisions D for Issue 1, F for 
Issue 2, B for Issue 3 and C for Issue 4, then the Contractor and the Developer get the 
payoffs HK$1,336,102 and HK$1,211,102 respectively. 
6. Results and discussions
6.1. Preliminary analyses 
The experiments were held at a university in Hong Kong with one hundred practicing 
construction professionals (n = 100). Their mean working experience in negotiation was 
14.9 years (SD = 9.42 years). Eighty-four of them were male and sixteen were female. 
The time taken to complete the experiment varied from 20 to 78 minutes (SD = 14 
minutes). Most of the participants (94%) accepted the token of thanks at the debriefing 
session. 36% and 64% of the participants were categorized as competitors and coop-
erators respectively by the decomposed game at the pre-negotiation stage. Participants 
were assigned with roles and in dyads to achieve a mixture of same- and mixed-gender 
dyads. All dyads negotiations were run in separate sessions. Fifty participants received 
“maximize own gain” instructions and the other fifty participants received “maximize 
joint gain” instructions. Cooperators were likely to identify their primary objective as 
“maximize joint gain” notwithstanding the “maximize own gain” instruction by their 
organizations (44%). This prompts an interesting issue for future research. There were 
32 breakdowns in the 200 issues negotiated (i.e. 16%). The findings echo other negotia-
tion studies that negotiation breakdown does occur even mutually beneficial offers are 
possible. The Cronbach’s alphas of the measurements for personality and withdrawal 
used range from 0.82 to 0.91 suggesting that the scales are reliability. The level of 
unitizing reliability of the coded transcript was high and all kappas are greater than .80 
for all categories. In the study, there are 21 categories and the coders agreed on 94% 
of the codes assigned. 
Hypothesis one 
Table 3 shows the descriptive data of the target variables. The mean of pre-negotiation 
withdrawal of competitor is significantly higher than that of cooperator (μcompetitor = 
4.86; μcooperator = 4.36; t-value = 5.23, p = .005). Thus, hypothesis one (H1) is support-
ed. The result suggests that competitor has higher propensity to withdraw. Competitors 
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become more tough and often resist yielding when making concession is less possible to 
them due to their high aspiration and self-concern (Pruitt, Kim 2004; Prietula, Weingart 
2011). 
Hypothesis two 
Pre-negotiation withdrawal was positively correlated with own (r = .31, p = .002) and 
joint distributive tactic (r = .25, p = .012). Furthermore, pre-negotiation withdrawal 
leads to less frequent use of own and joint integrative tactics (r = –.31, p =.002 and r = 
–.29, p =.004 respectively). The results supported hypothesis two (H2). It is suggested 
that withdrawal governs the underlying motive of a negotiator to engage in a particular 
course of action, that is, the use of different tactics (Lewicki et al. 2010; Pruitt, Kim 
2004). Low withdrawing individuals are likely to develop positive perception and seek 
to understand the positions of the counterparts.
Hypothesis three 
The result of the correlation analysis of pre-negotiation withdrawal and outcome does 
not support hypothesis three (H3) (i.e. r = –.11, p = .280 and r = –.13, p = .190 for own 
and joint outcomes respectively). The results suggested that withdrawal and outcome 
may be independent to each other or there are other intervening variables (Prietula, 
Weingart 2011). For example, a withdrawing attitude may be seen as a threat and press 
for concession by the other party. It is further suggested that the composition of dyad 
may be an intervening variable. 
Hypothesis four 
Data was further analyzed using a 2 (PE: ID or CR) × 2 (TA: DT or IN) × 3 (dyad 
composition: 2ID, 1ID1CR or 2CR) ANalysis Of VAriance (ANOVA). Table 4 shows 
that the patterns of means are in the predicted direction for both competitors and co-
Table 3. Descriptive, reliability and correlation statistic of overall sample (n = 100)
Variable μ SD 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Gen. 0.84 0.37 .227* .019 .100 .094 .109 –.109 –.109 –.205* –.114
2 Exp. 14.90 9.42  .181 .246* .337** .357** –.381** –.401** –.153 –.240*
3 WApre 4.76 0.88  .822** .286** .311** .249* –.310** –.285** –.108 –.132
4 WApost 2.93 1.23  –14.165** .910** .249* .243* –.246* –.245* –.004 .086
5 DT 29.16 21.16    .893** .978** –.775** –.786** –.075 –.113
6 DTjoint 58.32 41.37     –.780** –.804** –.083 –.115
7 IN 17.47 12.42    –3.680**  .866** .969** .130 .170
8 INjoint 34.94 24.07     –3.747**   .126 .175
9 NO 1,107,181 486,341         .720**
10 NOjoint 2,214,361 700,050          
Notes: Gen.: Gender, 0-female, 1-male; Exp.: Experience in year; pre: pre-negotiation; post: post-
negotiation; WA: Withdrawal; DT: Distributive tactic; IN: Integrative tactic; NO: negotiation outcome 
in turn of monetary payoff (in HK$); μ: mean; SD: Standard Deviation; Upper-diagonal: Correlation 
coefficient r; Diagonal: Cronbach’s alpha; Lower-diagonal: t value; significant level p, * p < 0.05; 
** p < 0.01.
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operators. Competitors use more distributive tactics and less integrative tactic than 
cooperators. Hypothesis four (H4) is thus supported. Moreover, competitors reported 
less use of distributive and more use of integrative tactics when they were negotiating 
with cooperators. This finding informs the importance of membership of a negotiation 
team (Olekalns, Smith 2003). In addition, the result suggests that negotiators represent-
ing Developer were generally more competitive (F = 9.120, sig. = .001). Competitive 
representatives of Developer use more distributive tactics than that of Contractor (F = 
10.732, sig. = .000). Nevertheless, cooperators achieved better payoff irrespective of 
which side they represent (F = 13.161, sig. = .000). A summary of the payoff by person-
ality and role is given in Table 5. This finding highlights the role of negotiator impact 
on her negotiating behavior (Cheung et al. 2009). 
Hypothesis five 
The distributive and integrative tactics used by the dyads were tallied. The results show 
that negotiations conducted in a distributive fashion did not achieve lower joint gain 
(r = –.12, sig. = .250) and an integrative negotiation marginally results in high joint gain 
Table 4. Mean comparisons as a function of dyad composition, personality and tactic
Composition 2ID 1ID1CR 2CR 
TA
PE
DT IN DT IN DT IN
ID 33.79e 15.36a 29.55d 17.18b – –
CR – – 28.23cd 18.41b 27.90c 17.83b
Note: Means that do not share a common letter in the subscript differ at p < .05 in Tukey’s Honestly 
Significant Difference tests; PE: Personality; ID: Competitor; CR: Cooperator; 2ID: Two Competitors 
in the dyad; 2CR: Cooperator in the dyad; 1ID1CR: One Competitor and One Cooperator in the dyad; 
TA: Tactic; DT: Distributive tactic; IN: Integrative tactic.
Table 5. Mean comparison of monetary and performance payoff as a function  





ID μ 1,051,976 1,069,402 1,060,689
SD 482,998 619,876 547,743
n 18 18 36
CR μ 1,111,486 1,155,178 1,133,332
SD 515,309 382,329 450,640
n 32 32 64
Overall μ 1,090,062 1,124,299 1,107,181
SD 499,766 476,989 486,341
n 50 50 100
Note: PE: Personality; ID: Competitor; CR: Cooperator; μ: mean; SD: Standard Deviation; n: number 
of samples.
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(r = .18, sig. = .080). Thus, hypothesis five (H5) is not supported. It is explained that 
when negotiating parties truly value one another’s outcomes, they would have to face 
a dilemma of enabling better outcomes for the other but not at their own expense. In 
this situation, the use of distributive tactics may have the effect of forcing the parties to 
actively participate in the exploration process and allow parties to locate every possible 
tradeoff (Olekalns, Smith 2013). In addition, distributive negotiation is likely to induce 
post-negotiation withdrawal (r = .24, sig. = .015) and integrative negotiation does lead 
to reduction in post-negotiation withdrawal (r = –.25, sig. = .014). 
6.2. Summary of hypotheses testing 
The personality-tactic relationship has been explored by examining the relationships 
among states of withdrawal, personality, tactics and negotiation outcomes. The rational-
ity assumption was experimentally tested, while there were 32 breakdowns out of the 
200 issues negotiated even mutually profitable options for a settlement are available. 
The findings further suggested that (H1) competitors are more likely to withdraw than 
cooperators; (H2) increasing withdrawal leads to more frequent use of distributive and 
less frequent use of integrative tactics and (H4) competitors use more distributive tactics. 
Other interesting findings for future study include: (1) frequent use of distributive tactics 
consequently led to higher withdrawal and (2) the presence of a cooperator facilitates 
the development of an integrative environment. These findings support the premise that 
the prospect of a negotiation is governed by the composition of the negotiation dyads, 
the state of withdrawal and the tactics used. Material reciprocation in information ex-
changes paves the path to genuine discussion. Thus, process management is paramount. 
6.3. Limitations 
There are several caveats for this study. First, there is a wide array of behavior to choose 
between contracting parties. The options may be non-commensurable. Simplifying the 
options for comparison purposes may cause the loss of generality. For example, coding 
and pure monetary outcome may oversimplify the complexity of negotiation. Second, 
having data from 100 subjects for the experiment is relatively low. To make the model 
more precise and concise, a larger sample size is desirable. Moreover, the participation 
of experienced construction practitioners as subjects for the study instead of student 
subjects has added authenticity of the study. Third, preliminary analysis showed that 
the gender composition of negotiating dyads affects their use of negotiator tactics. Male 
negotiators use less distributive tactics when they negotiate with a female counterpart 
(F = 10.972, sig. = .000). However, it is not further elaborated in the study because 
of the relatively small number of female subjects (n = 16). Lastly, the data set is from 
Hong Kong and this geographical characteristic need to be considered in interpreting 
the research findings. It is suggested that Chinese negotiation emphases on face giving, 
development of benign relationships and harmonious social structure.
P. T. Chow et al. The roles of withdrawal in the negotiator personality-tactic relationship
819
Conclusions
Negotiation involves striking deals by parties of incompatible interests. Negotiators to 
certain extent are mutually interdependent, in particular where outcomes that are jointly 
valued and targeted. Tactics are used by negotiators to achieve their desired outcomes 
that may just be own outcome maximization or optimal mutual gain. Personality plays 
a pivotal part on the choice of tactics. Moreover, mixed predictions of the personality-
tactic relationship have been derived from prior studies, thus suggesting the possibility 
of other intervening factors. This study examined the role of withdrawal, as an inter-
vening variable, in the negotiator personality-tactic relationship. State of withdrawal 
refers to the level of interest to continue with a negotiation. In a state of complete 
withdrawal, the interest to continue no longer exists and breakdown of the negotiation is 
inevitable. Five hypotheses have been developed in this regard to examine the relation-
ship among personality, tactic and withdrawal. A negotiation experiment including four 
dispute issues was used to collect data to test the hypotheses. Experienced construction 
professionals were the subjects. The results suggest that (1) competitors generally have 
higher level of withdrawal; (2) competitors are more likely to use distributive tactics 
than cooperators; (3) the higher the level of withdrawal, the more likely the negotiation 
to be conducted in distributive fashion. It is suggested that highly withdrawing nego-
tiators will conduct a negotiation competitively and the chance of failing to identify 
possible mutually beneficial negotiated settlement is higher. The state of withdrawal 
and personality of a negotiator influence the way he evaluates the motives and inten-
tions of the counterparts when a particular tactic is exercised. For example, a request 
for further information can be viewed as a refusal or search for common ground. This 
study contributes to the body of negotiation studies by factoring the influence of state of 
withdrawal in the personality-tactic relationship. The theoretical implication of the study 
is the importance of appropriate measures of dyadic interaction in negotiations research. 
The findings suggest how the quality of negotiated agreements in construction disputes 
can be measured in an experimental research on dyadic and mixed-motive negotiations. 
It is suggested that withdrawal and breakdown have been largely ignored as a dependent 
variable and that failure to take them into account may distort experimental results. In 
addition, the result shows that withdrawal can vary across experimental treatments as 
a result of differentials in the use of tactic. The findings timely remind construction 
managers about the need to have an appropriate team composition, by personality as 
well as technical skill and knowledge. 
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